thelema & determinism
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I recall something in Gunther's book saying something to effect of "Thelema is antithetical to determinism" and I'm not sure I really agree with this. Freedom is still compatible with determinism I think, that is if we take determinism to mean that in a deterministic universe only one history is possible and each cause has only one unique effect and vice versa. Only one causal chain would be possible in a deterministic world. Freedom is compatible with determinism insofar as the laws that govern a deterministic universe allow for the conditions necessary for freedom. No this is not a contradiction, if by freedom we mean that there is nothing to stop a persons volition affecting their action, or to stop a person from being able to change their own will by reflection upon their will. Even if such reflections or actions are externally caused the conditions for freedom are still met.
But what are your conditions for freedom? How do you define freedom? Do you agree with gunther that thelema is antithetical to determinism? Why? -
I guess that depends on what you mean by "determinism," right?
We're a school, so I like to start with a dictionary. Foregoing the dictionary for a moment... I think most people use "determinism" to mean, "you don't have a choice: You aren't at cause." And if that's what's meant, then I'd agree that Thelema and determinism are mutually exclusive. (Of course, it depends on what you mean by "you." There I go again...)
But... that isn't what "determinism" means. Merriam-Webster defines it as, "a theory or doctrine that acts ofthe will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws." Is Thelema compatible with this? Heck yeah! So is the magical theory in general. Magick certainly is based on the principle that events are inherently linked to prior events, and that phenomena unfold consistent with natural law.
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@Parzival said
"But what are your conditions for freedom? How do you define freedom? Do you agree with gunther that thelema is antithetical to determinism? Why?"
No, as Jim pointed out (in other words) most people confuse fatalism with determinism. Freedom actually *depends *on determinism (in a random universe, freedom would be have no purchase).
My favourite philosophical discussions of freedom are those of Daniel Dennett (Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves).
Basically, there's an kind of "freedom" represented in long-standing philosophical conundrums (based on unclear thinking) that we don't have, but it's not worth wanting anyway; the kind of freedom that we do have is worth wanting, but it's something that develops and grows and actually depends on the universe being at least to some extent deterministic, it's not an absolute.
The clearest way to think about is to think of how a sophisticated robot would navigate the world, given its lack of omniscience. That's the kind of freedom we have - we calculate options based on informational input, and we choose some options and forego others, just as a robot (a thoroughly deterministic system) would. This is unsurprising - since we are, basically, determnistic systems - highly sophisticated organic robots.
It's trivially true that "what will be will be". But that has nothing to do with freedom. (This is basically the same as what Crowley said with his "blow destiny!" quote - IIRC something about a man running to catch a train, and someone telling him perhaps he's not destined to catch it.)
Still less so, when it comes to socio-political freedom (i.e. freedom from interference by others).
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@gurugeorge said
"Freedom actually *depends *on determinism (in a random universe, freedom would be have no purchase)."
That's a great observation! (Much more cogent than my implication of a magician's surprise at being told, "You mean that if I do so-and-so I won't have the desired result? Huh?")
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@gurugeorge said
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@Parzival said
"But what are your conditions for freedom? How do you define freedom? Do you agree with gunther that thelema is antithetical to determinism? Why?"No, as Jim pointed out (in other words) most people confuse fatalism with determinism. Freedom actually *depends *on determinism (in a random universe, freedom would be have no purchase)."
Could you give us a brief definition of what you mean by both?
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@Shunyata said
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@gurugeorge said
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@Parzival said
"But what are your conditions for freedom? How do you define freedom? Do you agree with gunther that thelema is antithetical to determinism? Why?"No, as Jim pointed out (in other words) most people confuse fatalism with determinism. Freedom actually *depends *on determinism (in a random universe, freedom would be have no purchase)."
Could you give us a brief definition of what you mean by both?"
Fatalism is the truism/tautology that what will be will be; determinism is just a fancy restatement of causality - the idea that every event has a prior cause (or rather, in deterministic terms, a causal chain).
Expanding on that: it is true that what will be will be, and is therefore "unavoidable" in a metaphysical sense. We therefore have no metaphysical freedom in that sense. However, in a world determined by causality, inevitability and (so to speak) evitability are both live options. A casually determined event impinging on another causally determined event *can *be avoided by the second causally determined event, given a sufficiently sophisticated means of calculating (at least) the local conditions. That process is itself part of the global causal chain. Note that the calculations made by the avoider themselves *rely *on causality holding (i.e. on it being the case that every event has a prior cause).
Again, it is tautologically true that either avoidance will be successful or not, but that's hardly a problem to get exercised over. There never was any metaphysical freedom to lose (that is of course why we can't have it - i.e. it's not a failure of our powers that we can't have it).
It's interesting that (as I believe) this matter is tied up with the sense of ego and all that. There's an analogy between the imagined "self" (what is seen through in mystical experience) and the imagined agent of the imagined "metaphysical freedom" - they're all of a piece, all hang together, and all are illusory.
What's not illusory is a causal bundle (itself a bundle of intra-causal activity) calculating and acting to avoid detrimental other bundles, and cleaving to beneficial ones, and sometimes failing and sometimes succeeding. It's also not illusory that this process can be refined and improved - i.e. that freedom *evolves *(especially as you consider that over time the nature of the world the calculating machinery faces changes too).
And nor is it illusory that, on a political level (i.e. interaction between "friendly" causal bundles) social freedom is possible, and mutually beneficial.
My argument for social and political freedom: to maximise avoidance/cleaving-power for all, we need the maximum possible potential avoidance/cleaving-algorithms floating about in the memesphere, accessible to the calculation machinery. That fellow down the street might be odd, but his oddness might be the salvation of the race if conditions change appropriately. Since we are not omniscient, and have no way of knowing the meanderings of this giant, global causal chain, beforehand, we need as many potential solutions to potential problems as we can get, and *people *are the carriers of potential solutions, embodied in their biology, their styles of being and the kinds of action/problem-solving algorithms they generate. The ultimate upshot is that the *compossibility *of the maximum number freedoms should be maximised, and government ought to be understood as a *bodge *for this (a necessary evil) that we should attempt to constantly minimise, in favour of ground-up solutions - by which I mean anything and everything - the "little battalions" of Burke, social organisations of all sorts, from businesses to social clubs, from groups of friends to large political organisations, from mutual aid organisations to charities. What the liberal position has to trust is that, given freedom, people will come up with solutions. (That this trust has not been misplaced,historically, is shown by how much benefit the amount of freedom we have in liberal societies has produced, in comparison with illiberal societies. Liberal societies are more powerful, more prosperous, happier, etc., etc., than illiberal ones.)
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"Fatalism is the truism/tautology that what will be will be; determinism is just a fancy restatement of causality - the idea that every event has a prior cause (or rather, in deterministic terms, a causal chain). "
For the sake of clarity, determinism as far as I understand it, is a theory about the nature of causality in the universe, not a restatement of it, causality being the relationship between a cause and its effect. It says that this relationship is strict and a causal chain will follow a strict pattern and cannot deviate from it. For instance in a deterministic universe there would be only one possible history because the causal chain of history would be strictly defined from the first domino, due to its nature as being deterministic. But in a universe that is not deterministic, there are many "possible histories" because causality is not rigid and choice is possible. That is on a universal scale.
Fatalism actually takes away our freedom of action because it means we cannot control the outcome of our actions, regardless of our will. It is not true that "IF you had wanted to you could have done otherwise". Fatalism is not determinism, because in a deterministic world its still true that "IF you had wanted otherwise you could have done otherwise" if it was part of that particular world-history. In fatalism this is not true as your actions cannot be controlled.I hope that adds to the discussion
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Look at the idea of "soft" determininsm.
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@Parzival said
"Fatalism actually takes away our freedom of action because it means we cannot control the outcome of our actions, regardless of our will. It is not true that "IF you had wanted to you could have done otherwise". Fatalism is not determinism, because in a deterministic world its still true that "IF you had wanted otherwise you could have done otherwise" if it was part of that particular world-history. In fatalism this is not true as your actions cannot be controlled."
OTOH fatalism is actually a particular example of causation / determinism. Most simply, it postulates that "fate" is the cause. Then all we have to do is determine (!) what "fate" means
But there are subtle differences in seeming synonyms based on their origins. "Fate" is a word with a history of prophesy, has a root meaning of "what was spoken." That is, "It will be, because someone said so!" "Destiny," in contrast, is simply a destination - "That's where I'll end up!" - and carries a very different emotional feel.
Metaphysically, I've long seen Thelema as resolving the seeming divergences between these ideas. My own articulation is: "I'm a total believer in pre-destination because the universe is absolutely causal, and the causative agent is the deepest, most central aspect of myself, beyond anything usually called 'myself,' and it is omnipotent."