Thelemic Materialism (Thelemic Philosophy)
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@Los said
"You’ve never responded to this point. Not once. You just throw your hands up, stamp your feet, bluster that I’m impossible to talk to, mumble some ridiculous implications about there being some improbable weird global conspiracy of scientists, shriek about how I’m a moral nihilist, and then just vanish without bothering to address a single thing I’ve said."
Actually, you've done this same thing in the past -- with me, as a matter of fact. When we started to discuss ontology, and moved onto the subject of quantitative and qualitative data, the only accepted way that scientists collect the data about "reality" or ontology (those same scientists that you appeal to when questioning Simon), you stamped away, saying you refuse to have the reality discussion unless I agree to your terms, stating my scientific terms were "unnecessary jargon" and needed to stop, and that you didn't like my manner of speech because I used "puerile emoticons."
As if that response isn't puerile.
You then directly stated that probably I brought up all the scientific points to lord my scientific education over you -- this involved your fantasies of my personal motivations. I was merely trying to help you understand the terms that you weren't familiar with, as you admitted to not having a very strong scientific background.
Perhaps you understand why I couldn't consent to your terms of conversation -- because you wouldn't let me use certain words that were needed to have an intelligent conversation. And your injunction regarding the conversation was seemingly based on your admitted lack of understanding...
If you were willing to admit qualitative and quantitative data, and the epistemological ideas of intersubjectivity (which all scientists do), most of your arguments fall flat! But, I don't want them to fall flat!
THEY ARE TOO FUN AND ARTFUL
Now, will you please answer the following questions and not avoid them like you accuse others of doing?
@Frater 639 said
"Let's ask directly: Los, do you hold your "materialist" position exclusively? Do you adopt other philosophical positions at will? Has there been any pattern apprehension in regard to this?"
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Los,
There is no point in me presenting axioms you'll just say that you don't actually have for the reason I stated above. That's a fool's game.
If you believe your position to be "correct," then lets hear the incontrovertible truth from which your logic about what may be known stems. What's the foundation? If your position is the result of pure logic founded on incontrovertible truth, then what's that truth at the beginning? If it's more than a choice, if it's more than "I believe," then what is it?
If you can't state it, then you don't know your own argument, and it's just logic based on what you feel.
If you know it but don't state it, then you don't present a clear and lucid logical argument that can be judged on the strength of its own freestanding merit, beginning to end; instead, you just attempt to use logic to persuade based on what you feel that we *should feel *to be true.
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@Legis said
"If you believe your position to be "correct," then lets hear the incontrovertible truth from which your logic about what may be known stems. What's the foundation?"
I'm going to start from my specific position and move back more generally.
My position, on the particular issue that we're discussing, is that the physical world demonstrably exists and that -- at least at the moment -- there is insufficient evidence to think that any worlds beside the physical world exist (that is to say, there is insufficient evidence to think that there are some "spirit" worlds or "astral" worlds).
The "foundation" of this position is that the claim that the material world exists is very well supported (since the material world is clearly demonstrable), while claims that other worlds exist don't have anything approaching sufficient evidence to support them.
We could say also that "foundational" to my approach to this question -- and all questions, in fact -- is the notion (1) that it's easier to navigate the world if one has as accurate an understanding of the world as possible (given the evidence currently at one's disposal) and the notion (2) that the best way to acquire as accurate an understanding of the world as possible (given the evidence currently at one’s disposal at any particular moment) is to only accept claims for which there is (currently) sufficient evidence and to not accept claims for which there is (currently) insufficient evidence, always being ready to refine one’s understanding of claims as new evidence becomes available.
If you want to call the two “notions” I listed in the above paragraph “axioms,” I would dispute that because both notions are demonstrable.
Ok, now the ball’s in your court: where – exactly and precisely -- do you think I’m just “choosing” to believe stuff, just ‘cause? Be very specific in your answer -- and preferably succinct, if you can be -- and you’ll get a specific and thoughtful reply.
As I said before, depending on exactly what you say, I may even agree partially or fully with you. It depends on what you exactly have in mind, which is the whole point of having a discussion in the first place.
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It's a tautology.
You've already defined "exists" as being material, so you're basically saying, "the material is material, and stuff that is not material is not material."
profound
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Los,
"Sufficient evidence": "Sufficient" is a subjective-opinion word. Anyone can claim that evidence is "sufficient" for them. Personally, I'm fine with that. I think that's all that ever really happens anyway.
What you're suggesting, though, is that there is some standard for "sufficient" by which such a personal judgement may be ultimately and finally determined to be correct or incorrect.
What is that standard?
Your unstated axiom lies at the beginning of the logic for creating that standard.
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@Avshalom Binyamin said
"You've already defined "exists" as being material, so you're basically saying, "the material is material, and stuff that is not material is not material.""
I've never defined "exists" as being "material." The definition I gave of "exists" is "manifesting in a detectable way."
So, to give an obvious example, the ideas I have for my next short story aren't "material" in the sense that I can't wrap my knuckles on them, but these ideas obviously do manifest in a detectable way (even if they're only detectable by me until I write them down).
See? Avshalom Binyamin has provided us a great example of someone making conclusions based on his fantasies about my positions instead of bothering to read and comprehend my actual position and draw conclusions based on what I say.
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@Los said
"See? Avshalom Binyamin has provided us a great example of someone making conclusions based on his fantasies about my positions instead of bothering to read and comprehend my actual position and draw conclusions based on what I say."
That's why I asked instead, which you also complained about.
Now, to my question:
@Legis said
"What is that standard?
Your unstated axiom lies at the beginning of the logic for creating that standard."
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@Legis said
"Los,
"Sufficient evidence": "Sufficient" is a subjective-opinion word. Anyone can claim that evidence is "sufficient" for them. Personally, I'm fine with that. I think that's all that ever really happens anyway."
Obviously anyone can say that they find X, Y, or Z "sufficient" to support a claim (they "can" do this in the sense that it's physically possible for them to make such a statement).
However, there are indeed objective standards by which we evaluate whether evidence is sufficient or insufficient to support claims: these standards depend on the particular situation (on the exact claim, the specific evidence, and how the person making the claim is attempting to connect the evidence to the claim). For that reason, we can't sum these standards up into little pithy sayings that you can stick on your fridge, but we can -- for each and every instance of claims, evidence, and argument -- draw objective conclusions about whether arguments and evidence are sufficient to support the claims.
These answers aren’t always easy, so people may disagree – in the same way that people may “disagree” over the answer to a calculus problem that each one of them got different answers for.
If we all did a calculus problem, and we each got a different answer, obviously each one of us would be able to “show our work,” and could say, “But I did the work right here, and my work convinced me!!” but only one of us would be able to show the work properly proceeding through the steps necessary to solve the problem.
It would be no use to object, “But “properly proceeding” is subjective! There’s no way to know who’s right!” because there is a way to know who’s right.
Take a simple case as illustrative. Let’s say you have a friend who can’t find his keys, and he tells you, “I think it’s most likely that aliens took my keys.” You ask why he thinks this. He says, “I had a daydream about aliens yesterday, and I think that was really a transmission from the mother ship to my mind, telling me that I’m being watched.”
Obviously, this guy is convinced by that argument. He’s “showed his work” and he finds it sufficient to support his claim. But is it actually sufficient? Of course not. A daydream can’t be evidence for what happened to one’s keys. Even if it were true that the daydream were a communication – and there’s no reason to think that it is – there still would be no valid way to conclude that whoever sent the communication also took the keys.
This guy is objectively wrong in thinking that he has sufficient evidence to support that claim, just like the kid in class who has the wrong answer is objectively wrong that his work sufficiently demonstrates the answer he volunteered. It doesn’t matter that the kid can “show his work” and it doesn’t matter that the guy can provide an argument that he thinks is sufficient…they’re both demonstrably wrong.
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@Los said
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@Avshalom Binyamin said
"You've already defined "exists" as being material, so you're basically saying, "the material is material, and stuff that is not material is not material.""I've never defined "exists" as being "material." The definition I gave of "exists" is "manifesting in a detectable way."
So, to give an obvious example, the ideas I have for my next short story aren't "material" in the sense that I can't wrap my knuckles on them, but these ideas obviously do manifest in a detectable way (even if they're only detectable by me until I write them down)."
So, something you imagine, exists, because you can detect it?
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Los, I'm noticing that you keep dancing around such an axiom with Av. Only, you don't seem to realize that it's what I'm talking about.
It would go something like this:
"Everything that exists manifests itself in a detectable way."
Response? Correction?
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@Legis said
"Los, I'm noticing that you keep dancing around such an axiom with Av. Only, you don't seem to realize that it's what I'm talking about.
It would go something like this:
"Everything that exists manifests itself in a detectable way."
Response? Correction?"
Exactly. He's caught!
Since "manifestation in a detectable way" inherently interfaces the senses, and (according to Los' position today) this is the basis of how something is known to "exist," by his own words, his position is on par with subjective idealism.
Los, I suggest you go read Bishop Berkeley and brush up on your 17th Century immaterialism.
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@Avshalom Binyamin said
"So, something you imagine, exists, because you can detect it?"
Yes, it exists as an act of make believe. The plot of my short story that I'm imagining right now is a real act of imagination going on in my head.
In the same way, when one of you imagines chatting up one of your preternatural buddies, that's a real act of imagination.
But what doesn't exist -- in the sense of existing separate from you in the same way that your table exists separately from you -- is the preternatural buddy itself. That preternatural buddy exists only as an act of make believe, not as an actual separate being. In the same way, my short story plot exists only as an act of make believe, not something separate from me.
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@Legis said
"Los, I'm noticing that you keep dancing around such an axiom with Av. Only, you don't seem to realize that it's what I'm talking about.
It would go something like this:
"Everything that exists manifests itself in a detectable way."
Response? Correction?"
Ok, are you saying that this is an undemonstrated axiom from which I begin?
I'm not quite comfortable with that particular phrasing because I suppose there could be something that exists but that doesn't manifest in a way that is detectable by any human ever, but in that case, such a thing would be completely indistinguishable from something that doesn't exist, and, therefore, no human would be justified in thinking that it actually does exist.
I would phrase it as, "For all practical purposes, 'real things' or 'existent things' are those things that manifest in detectable ways, such that at least one human is capable, at some point in time, of detecting it. Anything that 'exists' but is utterly undetectable by any human being ever is completely indistinguishable from not-existing and can be treated, for all practical purposes, as not existing."
But I don't think that claim is undemonstrable. I induced it from my experience of real things...manifesting in detectable ways is a property of all real things.
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@Los said
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@Avshalom Binyamin said
"So, something you imagine, exists, because you can detect it?"Yes. The plot of my short story that I'm imagining right now is a real act of imagination going on in my head.
In the same way, when one of you imagines chatting up one of your preternatural buddies, that's a real act of imagination.
But what doesn't exist -- in the sense of existing separate from you in the same way that your table exists separately from you -- is the preternatural buddy itself. That preternatural buddy exists only as an act of make believe, not as an actual separate being."
Well, that's difficult to prove. How would you suggest we set up the experiment? Could we include subjective (qualitative) data?
Please address how anything exists without one perceiving it. Again, you need to rethink your idea of materialism -- it seems much closer to subjective idealism.
The issue lies with you saying you believe something exists in the mind, but you can't measure it with objective measurements (quantitative measurement) -- this has to do with your bias of emphasizing one aspect of research over the other. This a superstitious belief.
Do you have a problem admitting when something smells like bread? How do people agree on what smells like bread?
This is how we arrive a correlating data in the astral, bro.
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Well, I think part of the problem is that everyone keeps jumping several steps ahead to how they think Los is defeated before he gets the chance to actually understand and accept the position as his own, without having to worry about someone telling him it's wrong before he gets there himself.
I'm hoping to go one step at a time so that, if nothing else, he can fully, logically own being a naturalist, materialist, or whatever, beginning to end, without just devolving into the merely superficial authority of eternal doubt's rhetorical ability.
I'm looking for positive "knowing" instead of merely negative "knowing."
@Los said
" "For all practical purposes, 'real things' or 'existent things' are those things that manifest in detectable ways, such that at least one human is capable, at some point in time, of detecting it. Anything that 'exists' but is utterly undetectable by any human being ever is completely indistinguishable from not-existing and can be treated, for all practical purposes, as not existing.""
This gets at it, but it adds a bit of the logic that supports and follows.
I think it would be good to try to get to the most concise statement of the idea. Something like:
"That which exists is detectable."
Rephrase?
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@Los said
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@Avshalom Binyamin said
"So, something you imagine, exists, because you can detect it?"Yes, it exists as an act of make believe. The plot of my short story that I'm imagining right now is a real act of imagination going on in my head.
In the same way, when one of you imagines chatting up one of your preternatural buddies, that's a real act of imagination.
But what doesn't exist -- in the sense of existing separate from you in the same way that your table exists separately from you -- is the preternatural buddy itself. That preternatural buddy exists only as an act of make believe, not as an actual separate being. In the same way, my short story plot exists only as an act of make believe, not something separate from me."
So we both agree that there is a non material world of imagination and ideas.
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He'll say that "world" doesn't exist. Just the ideas and imaginings themselves. Those are detectable, not their world.
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@Legis said
"I think it would be good to try to get to the most concise statement of the idea. Something like:
"That which exists is detectable.""
Well, the problem here is that what we're talking about is complicated enough that trying to condense it into fortune-cookie type sayings is inevitably going to lead to misunderstandings.
If we're talking about what humans are justified in accepting as existent -- speaking in practical terms, in the context of useful knowledge -- then I would say that "Someone is justified in accepting as existent that which is detectable, once the person in question has sufficient evidence for thinking the thing in question has been detected."
In that case, maybe we could use your fortune cookie statement as a brief summary of that concept.
But if we're talking about "exist" in the sense of being some real ontological object -- in the sense that it's possible for something to exist in another dimension, such that no human could ever possibly detect it -- then no, your fortune cookie statement wouldn't be sufficient.
In such a case -- where we're talking about, let's say, some being that inhabits another dimension that no human has ever detected and that no human, no matter what any human ever does, could ever possibly detect that being, ever -- I would argue that such a being, "existent" though it may be in some sense, is, from the perspective of humans, completely and totally indistinguishable from something that doesn't exist and that humans are more than justified as treating it as something that doesn't exist.
I don't think it particularly helps the conversation to try to boil these complex ideas into sentences of monosyllabic words.
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@Avshalom Binyamin said
"So we both agree that there is a non material world of imagination and ideas."
Depends on what you mean. Concepts and ideas are real things and we can't poke them with a stick, so they're obviously "non material" in one sense.
But on the other hand, we know that these concepts and ideas emerge from electrical activity in physical brains and are stored in physical brains. Further, we have no reason to suppose that these things do -- or even could -- exist apart from material brains. So they're not "non material" in the sense of being utterly separate from material.
As ever, it depends on the meaning of the words being used. Which is exactly why it's so unproductive to try to reduce everything to fortune cookie sayings.
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So are we back to your tautology, that only the material is material?